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Abstract
I study the interactions of product and labor market institutions
in a model characterized by a three-states representation of the labor
market. Firms bargain with unions over wages and employment lev-
els. This generates unemployment. Households take the associated
unemployment risk as given in making their participation decisions.
Unemployment inserts a wedge between labor supply (participation)
and employment. Employment matters because it determines output.
I uncover two feedback mechanisms, each reinforced by endogenous
participation. The ﬁrt exploits the endogeneity of the number of ﬁrms
to amplify the adverse eﬀects on output of regulations and frictions that
raise labor costs, work practice rigidities and the bargaining power of
workers. The second exploits the endogeneity of market size to am-
plify the adverse eﬀects of product market frictions that raise the costs
of entry or of operation for ﬁrms. The multiplier eﬀects due to these
feedback mechanisms have interesting implications for the current pol-
icy debate. Labor market reforms that reduce the cost of labor are
actually more attractive when one considers the endogenous structure
of the product market. Similarly, pro-competitive product market re-
forms are more attractive when one considers the positive feedback on
market structure that runs through the labor market.
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Employment, Unemployment.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper I study the interaction between non-competitive labor and
product markets in order to shed new light on the eﬀects of institutions and
policies on employment, unemployment and output. I consider a model with
a three-states representation of the labor market. I take the view that un-
employment is a wedge between labor force participation and employment,
and that employment matters because it determines output.
Speciﬁcally, employment (and thus ouptput) is the outcome of actions
taken on two margins. On one margin agents choose whether to participate
to the labor market in the presence of unemployment risk. Unemployment,
in other words, is involuntary in that households control the mass of mem-
bers that supply labor but not their probability of employment. Accordingly,
some of the participating members do not ﬁnd employment even if at the
going wage they wish to work. On the other margin, employers (ﬁrms) bar-
gain with unions over wages and employment and thereby determine how
many of the individuals willing to work actually ﬁnd employment. This
approach allows me to identify separately supply-side and demand-side de-
terminants of employment and unemployment. It also allows me to derive
from the model’s primitives a reservation wage that is decreasing in the
unemployment rate.
The explicit consideration of a participation margin, corresponding to a
standard elastic labor supply, proves to be very important in understanding
the interaction of the labor and product markets. One reason is that it is
an additional determinant of market size and thereby of ﬁrms’ incentives to
enter. Another is that it ampliﬁes the eﬀects of changes in labor market
conditions that aﬀect unemployment. Finally, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, it helps make sense of the trends in participation, employment and
employment rates that one sees in the data.
Charts 1 and 2 display the evolution over the last 30-40 years of the par-
ticipation, employment and unemployment rates for the US and the EU15.
It is often argued that the remarkable fact of the last few decades is the seem-
ingly permanent rise in unemployment rates in Europe. Since the US, in
contrast, displays a hump-shaped behavior of the unemployment rate, many
writers and commentators have concluded that there is a “European unem-
ployment problem” and that there must be something about the structure
of European economies that prevents the unemployment rate from returning
to its pre-1970s level. What Charts 1 and 2 show, however, is that the rise
in European unemployment — and the “bubble” in US unemployment — took
place in the context of the secular rise in participation that has occurred on
2both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, the rise of unemployment in Europe
has not produced a fall in employment. It appears, then, that to explain
the long-term employment performance of both the US and EU15 economies
one needs to look primarily at the participation margin. Unemployment is
nonetheless important in that it provides a wedge between employment and
participation, a wedge that entails substantial social costs.
The model that I propose in this paper, based on a three-state repre-
sentation of the labor market, captures much of the forces underlying these
dynamics. It also provides some novel analytical insight on how institutions
and policies aﬀect macroeconomic performance. To see how this works, it is
useful to go through an example.
Labor market institutions, tax policy and other factors that raise labor
costs reduce employers’ willingness to hire workers. In bargaining models
this typically results in lower employment and higher unemployment. My
model sheds light on two additional dimensions of this mechanism.
• The adverse eﬀects on output of regulations and frictions that raise
labor costs, work practice rigidities and the bargaining power of workers
are larger with endogenous participation. This feature follows from the
fact that the induced fall in employment is larger when labor supply
is elastic and individuals withdraw from the labor force in response to
a worsening of the labor market.
• T h ef a l li ne m p l o y m e n ts h r i n k st h es i z eo ft h em a r k e ta n dt h e r e b y
triggers a reduction in the number of ﬁrms. This entails a multiplier
eﬀe c tt h a ta m p l i ﬁes the adverse eﬀects of these factors because the
fall in the number of ﬁrms reduces employment further than if one
considers the labor market in isolation.
In a similar fashion, the model sheds light on the role of factors that
aﬀect the product market. The regulation of entry and competition, for
example, is typically thought to lead to more concentrated markets. My
analysis reﬁnes this mechanism in two dimensions.
• The endogeneity of employment entails a feedback mechanism running
from the product market to the labor market. Speciﬁcally, regulations
and frictions that raise the costs of entry and/or of operation for ﬁrms
result in a larger reduction of the number of ﬁrms than if employment
were held constant. There is thus another multiplier eﬀect at work
that exploits the endogeneity of market size to amplify the adverse
eﬀects on output of interventions that worsen the product market.
3• Because the multiplier eﬀect running from the product to the labor
market is driven by the endogeneity of employment, the adverse eﬀects
on output of product market regulations are larger with endogenous
participation.
The analysis of the feedback mechanisms linking labor and product mar-
kets has two general implications concerning the current policy debate.
First, labor market reforms that reduce the cost of labor, like those ad-
vocated by the OECD in its Jobs Study (1994), have eﬀects in the product
market that reinforce their direct eﬀects on employment and unemployment.
In other words, the reforms advocated by the OECD are even more attrac-
tive when one considers the endogenous structure of the product market.
The second implication stems from the positive feedback in the other
direction. Product market reforms that attract entry raise employment and
reduce unemployment. The rise in employment expands the economy’s scale
of activity and attracts more entry, which further raises employment and
educes unemployment. Hence, the increase in entry that these reforms gen-
erate is larger than one would expect if the labor market eﬀect of, say, lower
barriers to entry were ignored. These results provide a theoretical rationale
for the pro-competitive reforms advocated in a series of studies undertaken
at the McKinsey Global Institute (1995, 1997) and show that these reforms
are even more attractive when one considers the positive feedback on market
structure that runs through the labor market.1
I proceed as follows. In Section 2 I brieﬂy review the literature and place
the paper in context. In Section 3, I set up the model that I use to develop
the main argument of the paper. In Section 4, I study the instantaneous
equilibrium of labor market. In Section 5, I study the general equilibrium
of the model and show how the interaction of product and labor markets
determines employment, unemployment and output. In Section 6, I discuss
the eﬀects of structural parameters and policy instruments. I conclude in
Section 7.
2 Related literature
Economists agree that unemployment is high in economies where unemploy-
ment beneﬁts are unrelated to the individual’s eﬀort to ﬁnd work, the labor
force is organized in sectoral (or ﬁrm-level) unions that do not coordinate
1See also Baily (1993), Baily and Gersbach (1995), Gersbach and Sheldon (1996) and
Gersbach (1999) for a survey article.
4their activities, and taxation raises the cost of labor.2 Research undertaken
in the 90s, reviewed in Nickell (1999) and Gersbach (1999), has augmented
this view and emphasized that the characteristics of the product market
matter as well. Consequently, recent research has focused on the role of
product market factors, in particular the regulation of entry and competi-
tion, in determining macroeconomic performance (see, e.g., Boeri, Nicoletti
and Scarpetta 2000, Fonseca et al. 2001, Pissarides 2001, Bertrand and
Kramarz 2002, Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003, Spector 2004, Ebell and Hae-
fke 2004). This literature indeed has grown so rapidly, and branched out
in so many directions, that it is becoming diﬃcult to keep track of all that
is going on without the aid of surveys. A recent one that I found quite is
useful is Schiantarelli (2005).
Much of this literature focuses on unemployment and studies models
where labor supply is inelastic so that employment and unemployment are
forced to move in opposite directions. The mechanism giving rise to unem-
ployment varies across models, but the logic that all that matters for labor
market outcomes occurs on the demand side seems to go unchallenged. An
exception is Rogerson (2002), who argues that we should rather focus on em-
ployment because it reﬂects more directly the resource allocation achieved
by the economy.
Of all those mentioned above, the papers that come closer to what I do
here are Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004). Those paper
diﬀer from this one in three substantial ways. First, they do not include a
participation margin so that they restrict attention to a two-states repre-
sentation of the labor market. Second, they do not include a consumption-
saving decision. Third, they do not include a (sunk) entry cost. These two
omissions imply that the models do not have well-deﬁned transitional dy-
namics. My model, in contrast, provides a very tractable characterization
of transitional dynamics in response to policy and structural shocks.
2In his recent review of the state of the art, for example, Nickell (1997, p. 72) con-
cludes: “High unemployment is associated with the following labor market features: (1)
generous unemployment beneﬁts that are allowed to run indeﬁnitely, combined with little
or no pressure on the unemployed to obtain work and to low levels of active intervention to
increase the ability and willingness of the unemployed to work; (2) high unionization with
wages bargained collectively and no coordination between either union or employers in
wage bargaining; (3) high overall taxes impinging on labor or a combination of high mini-
mum wages for young people associated with high payroll taxes; and (4) poor educational
standards at the bottom end of the labor market.”
53 The Model
3.1 Production
A representative competitive ﬁrm produces a ﬁnal good that can be con-













,² > 1( 1 )
where ² is the elasticity of product substitution, xi is the ﬁnal producer’s
use of each diﬀerentiated good, and N is the mass of intermediate goods
(also the mass of intermediate ﬁrms; see below).
The ﬁnal good is the numeraire.T h e ﬁnal producer thus maximizes
proﬁts subject to the budget constraint Y =
R N
0 pixidi,w h e r epi is the price



















is the price index for intermediate goods.
Each intermediate good is produced by one ﬁrm with the technology
xi =( li − φ)
θ , 0 < θ < 1, φ > 0( 3 )
where xi is output and li is labor. This technology exhibits diminishing
returns to labor and a ﬁxed labor requirement. The latter implies a ﬁxed
operating cost that justiﬁes the assumption that each good is produced by
one, and only one, ﬁrm. Since intermediate ﬁrms are atomistic, moreover,
they take the price index P at the denominator of (2) as given and face
demand curves that feature constant elasticity ².
In equilibrium the proﬁt of the competitive ﬁnal producer is zero. It
follows that the price index of intermediate goods equals the price of the
ﬁnal good, P = 1, and without loss of generality can be omitted from (2) in
the rest of the analysis.
63.2 Consumption, saving and labor market participation
There is one representative household with a continuum of mass Λ(t)=

















dt, ρ > λ > 0, ψ > 0
subject to the ﬂow budget constraint
˙ A = rA+ Ls [W (1 − τ)pe + Bpu]+T − C, 0 < τ < 1
where ρ is the individual discount rate, C is consumption, Ls is the mass
of household members that oﬀer their labor for a wage (participate in the
labor market), A is assets holding, and T is a lump-sum transfer from the
government. (To simplify the notation I omit the time argument whenever
confusion does not arise.) The assets available to the household are own-
ership shares of ﬁrms. Hence, r is the rate of return on stocks. The assets
market is competitive.
Three features of this setup are important. First, unemployment is in-
voluntary: the household controls the mass of members that supply labor
but not their probability of employment. Thus, some of the participating
members do not ﬁnd employment even if at the going wage they wish to
work. The probability of being employed is pe; the probability of being
unemployed is pu. The household takes these probabilities as given.
The second feature, which is a direct consequence of involuntary unem-
ployment, is that the budget constraint contains the household’s expected
income: each household member that participates in the labor market earns
the after-tax wage W(1−τ) if he is employed and the unemployment insur-
ance beneﬁt B if he is unemployed.3 Since there are N ﬁrms, the pre-tax








where the weight assigned to the wage wi paid by ﬁrm i is its share of
employment li/L.
3I assume that the beneﬁt is not taxed. This is extreme, but it is simply meant to
capture the fact that unemployment beneﬁts are taxed more lightly than wages; see Daveri
and Tabellini (2000, pp. 58-59) for evidence on this point.
7The third feature captures the basic trade-oﬀ that governs labor supply
and thus determines workers’ wage demands. The household’s instantaneous
utility contains a term that captures the role of household members that do
not participate in the labor market; one can think of home production or
other related activities the output of which is shared by all household mem-
bers.4 This determines the opportunity cost of labor market participation,
and thus contributes to determine the wage demands of employed workers.
Participation takes 100% of the household’s member time.
The maximization problem outlined above yields well-known results with
some novel features. The household follows the usual saving rule
˙ C
C
= r + λ − ρ (4)
and equates the beneﬁt from the marginal household member’s participation
to the cost. Formally,
W (1 − τ)pe + Bpu =
ψC
Λ − Ls.
On the left-hand-side of this expression there is the expected income from
participation, on the right-hand-side there is the expected cost, the foregone
contribution of the marginal individual to household production. Observe
now that given employment L, the unemployment rate is
u ≡ 1 −
L
Ls.
Assuming (instantaneous) random allocation of work among household mem-
bers participating in the labor market, I can write pu = u and pe =1− u.5
(Recall that the representative household takes these probabilities as given.)
Participation therefore can be written
Ls = Λ −
ψC
W (1 − τ) − [W (1 − τ) − B]u
. (5)
This is the economy’s upward sloping labor supply curve. Consumption, C,
enters negatively because it raises the opportunity cost of participation; the
4Implicit in this setup is the assumption that the household insures its members par-
ticipating in the labor market against unemployment. This simpliﬁes the analysis because
all household members get the same ﬂow of utility.
5In practice, I am assuming that jobs are rationed through a lottery and that there are
no unﬁlled vacancies. This corresponds to the concept of structural unemployment — as
opposed to frictional unemployment — deﬁned in Bertola (2001).
8unemployment insurance beneﬁt, B, enters positively because it raises the
expected income from participation.6
Labor supply depends on the unemployment rate via two eﬀects. First,
higher unemployment means that the participating individual is less likely to
be employed and thus to earn the after-tax wage. This lowers the expected
beneﬁt of participation. Second, higher unemployment means that the in-
dividual is more likely to be unemployed and thus to draw the insurance
beneﬁt B. This raises the expected beneﬁt of participation. The model’s
equilibrium conditions imply that the after-tax wage is higher than the un-
employment beneﬁt so that labor supply is decreasing in the unemployment
rate (see below). This captures a “discouraged worker eﬀect” whereby worse
employment prospects in the labor market lower a worker’s expected income
and thus reduce participation.
3.3 Wages and prices at the ﬁrm level
The ﬁrm bargains with its workers over the wage and employment. I follow
the standard approach and model bargaining as
max
wi,li
[(1 − γ)logπi + γ log(wi (1 − τ) − Wa)li], 0 < γ < 1
The parameter γ is the relative bargaining power of the workers. The ﬁrm
and its workers maximize jointly the log-geometric average of proﬁts and
employees surplus. The ﬁrm and the workers take the alternative,
Wa = W (1 − τ)(1− u)+Bu =
ψC
Λ − Ls,
as given since it depends on aggregate variables. If negotiations break down,
the worker can quit the ﬁrm and reenter the labor market, in which case he
gets the expected labor income. Alternatively, he can allocate all of his time
to household production, in which case he gets the value of his marginal
contribution. These two options are equivalent because in deciding labor
supply the household sets them equal (see above).
6It is important not to confuse the role of the unemployment insurance beneﬁti n
raising expected income from participation with its role as the alternative to the wage in
a setup where the worker chooses whether to accept employment or stay unemployed. It
is well known that in that setup employment is decreasing in the beneﬁt. The resulting
unemployment, however, is not involuntary.
9I now use the production function (3) and the demand curve (2) to write
instantaneous proﬁts as















< 1. This parameter combines diminishing returns to
labor and the responsiveness of demand to price into a single number that,
together with the ﬁxed cost, regulates the curvature of the ﬁrm’s revenue
function with respect to employment li.S p e c i ﬁcally, the elasticity of revenue









This elasticity is smaller the more pronounced are diminishing returns to
labor (low θ), the less elastic is demand (low ²), the smaller is the ﬁxed
operating cost (low φ), and the larger is the ﬁrm (large li).





































which says that workers get the reservation wage (adjusted for labor income
taxation) plus a fraction of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Using this result, I can rewrite












ηpixi + φ. (6)
10Using this expression and the deﬁnition of proﬁt, I can rewrite the equation













This says that the wage is set as a markup over the reservation wage and
that the markup is the inverse of the employment elasticity of revenue minus
1 .A c c o r d i n gt ot h i se x p r e s s i o nl a r g e rﬁrms pay higher than average wages
since they operate in the less elastic region of their revenue curve.
4 Instantaneous equilibrium of the labor market
To characterize the labor market more sharply, I assume that the government
cannot borrow and satisﬁes the budget constraint T = τWL− B(Ls − L),
which determines the lump-sum transfer, T, as the diﬀerence between tax
revenues and expenditure on beneﬁts.7 I also assume that the unemployment
beneﬁt is a constant fraction of the wage, B = σW.
Next I make use of the fact that symmetry implies that all ﬁrms pay the
same wage so that wi = W. The wage equation (7) yields
1=
(1 − τ)(1− u)+σu
1 − τ
(1 + m).
This can be solved for
u =
1 − τ












7This setup keeps to a minimum the eﬀect of the government on economic activity.
Only two distortions matter: taxation, which lowers labor supply and raises the pre-tax
wage that unions demand, and the unemployment beneﬁt, which raises both labor supply
and the pre-tax wage that unions demand.
11Observe that unemployment is an increasing function of ﬁrm employment l








1 − τ − σ
σ
,
which says that the upper asymptote of (8) is less than 1. This condition is
surely satisﬁed if σ = τ =0 .
An important property of this model is that the equilibrium of the la-
bor market is not fully characterized by the unemployment equation (8)
because labor supply is endogenous. Speciﬁcally, according to equation (5)
participation is
Ls = Λ −
ψ




I can divide through by population size Λ and multiply and divide the ratio
C





































where c ≡ C/Y is the economy’s consumption ratio and WL/Y is the wage
share.
I now use the expression for ﬁrm employment (6), the wage setting equa-





It h e nu s et h er e l a t i o nL = Nl to compute the wage share as
WL
Y




12Observe that the wage share is decreasing in ﬁrm employment l.
Equations (8) through (12) provide a complete characterization of the
labor market at a point in time once one knows ﬁrm employment l and
the consumption ratio c. The evolution over time of these two variables
depends on the entry process that provides the fundamental accumulation
mechanism of this model. The next section discusses this process in detail.
As an intermediate step toward that goal, I use (12) to rewrite the expression











where n ≡ N/Λ is the mass of ﬁrms per capita. I shall refer to this expression
as the participation locus and to equation (8) above as the bargaining locus.
The joint solution of these two equations characterizes the instantaneous
equilibrium of the labor market in relation to the mass of ﬁrms per capita
n and the consumption ratio c. Figure 1 and the following proposition
illustrate.8 A + on top of a variable denotes a positive partial derivative,
a − denotes a negative partial derivative, while a ? denotes an ambiguous
sign.
Proposition 1 The instantaneous equilibrium of the labor market is char-
acterized by the following two functions mapping the mass of ﬁrms per










































Associated to these, there is the following function mapping the mass of ﬁrms























8Inspection of the ﬁgure suggests that is possible that the two curves fail to intersect
so that in equilibrium u = 0. I show below that in steady state it is always the case that
the intersection occurs and u>0.
13The mechanism explaining the comparative statics properties of this
equilibrium is the following. The bargaining locus is upward sloping be-
cause an increase in ﬁrm employment l yields an increase in the markup m.
Restoring equilibrium requires a rise in unemployment u. The participation
locus, in contrast, is downward sloping. The reason is that higher ﬁrm em-
ployment implies a lower wage (due to diminishing returns to labor in the
ﬁrm production technology) and, holding constant n, higher aggregate em-
ployment. The latter implies a higher marginal cost of participation because
diminishing returns in household activity imply that its marginal product
rises. Restoring equilibrium then requires a fall in unemployment u that
provides better job prospects to the marginal worker. The higher probabil-
ity of employment raises the marginal beneﬁt of participation while at the
same time reduces the sacriﬁce of time needed for market participation and
thereby rises the amount of time devoted to home activity, thus reducing its
marginal product.
Now observe that an increase in n does not aﬀect the bargaining locus
while it implies higher aggregate employment and thereby a higher marginal
product of home activity. The corresponding lower participation requires a
compensatory fall in unemployment in order to satisfy equation (13). It
follows that the participation locus shifts down. As a result, both ﬁrm em-
ployment and the unemployment rate fall. In contrast to ﬁrm employment,
the employment ratio rises with n. To see why, imagine to apply the relation
L/Λ = nl to rewrite the bargaining and participation loci in (L/Λ,u)s p a c e
instead of (l,u) space. With this change of variable, the participation locus
shifts up because the increase in n reduce ﬁrm employment l and raises the
labor share. This attracts participation and for equation (13) to hold there
must be a compensatory increase in unemployment u. The bargaining locus
instead shifts down because the higher n spreads employment over more
ﬁrms and makes them smaller, thus producing a smaller markup over the
reservation wage. Consequently, unemployment falls and the employment
ratio rises.
An increase in the consumption ratio c leaves the bargaining locus un-
aﬀected while reduces participation and thereby requires a compensatory
fall in unemployment to satisfy equation (13). As a consequence, the par-
ticipation locus shifts down and the new equilibrium exhibits lower ﬁrm
employment and unemployment. Notice that since L/Λ = nl and n is given,
the employment ratio falls as well.
An interesting property of this equilibrium is that is captures the tension
between the diﬀerent eﬀects of structural parameters on the employment
and the participation margins. Ultimately this is because unemployment
14provides a wedge between labor supply and employment. For example, the
reason why the eﬀect of γ on ﬁrm employment is ambiguous is that the
stronger bargaining power of workers results in a larger wage share — see
(12) — and thereby in higher participation. This eﬀect shows up in Figure
1 as an upward shift of the participation locus. The expansion of labor
supply should yield larger employment (aggregate and, holding constant n,
per ﬁrm). However, the stronger bargaining power of unions also results in
higher unemployment, an eﬀect captured by an upward shift of the bargain-
i n gl o c u s—s e e( 8 ) .T h eo v e r a l le ﬀect on unemployment is surely positive,
while the overall eﬀect on employment is ambiguous. Notice how this logic
also explains the eﬀects of the replacement ratio σ. Higher unemployment
beneﬁts raise both participation and unemployment — both the participation
and bargaining loci shift up — so that the overall eﬀect on employment is
ambiguous.
In contrast, higher taxation of wages τ reduces participation and results
in smaller employment (aggregate and per ﬁrm). This eﬀect shows up as a
downward shift of the participation locus. On the other hand, higher taxa-
tion of wages raises unions’ demands and tends to raise unemployment, an
eﬀect captured by the upward shift of the bargaining locus. As one can see,
if the fall in participation is suﬃciently large employment and unemploy-
m e n tc a nb o t hf a l l .I fi n s t e a dp a r t i c i p a tion is not very sensitive to after-tax
wages, employment falls and unemployment rises.
Similar reasoning explains the eﬀects of the parameters η and φ that
regulate the elasticity with respect to employment of the ﬁrm’s revenue.
An increase in either of them lowers the markup m and raises the wage
share thereby shifting the bargaining locus down and the participation locus
up. This results in higher employment and higher or lower unemployment
depending on which force dominates.
5 General Equilibrium
The previous analysis has provided a complete characterization of the labor
market at a point in time given the consumption ratio c and the mass of
ﬁrms per capita n. To characterize the evolution over time of these two
variables and thereby of the whole economy I now need to characterize the
entry process that provides the fundamental accumulation mechanism of this
model. The construction of the general equilibrium of this economy is then
straightforward. There is an Euler equation characterizing the equilibrium
of the assets market, whereby all rates of return are equalized, and an equa-
15tion characterizing the equilibrium of the goods market, whereby output is
allocated to consumption and investment. The latter equation is where this
model deviates from the standard setup because the state variable of this
economy is the mass of ﬁrms per capita.
5.1 Entry
The ﬂow of dividends accruing to ﬁrm i’s shareholders is πi. Accordingly,


























According to this expression, the proﬁtr a t eo fﬁrm i is increasing in ﬁrm
employment.
I assume that entrepreneurs create new ﬁrms by sinking an entry cost
βpixi in units of ﬁnal output. Notice that this cost is proportional to the
ﬁrm’s initial revenue. Entrants are active if the value of entry is equal to its
cost, that is, if Vi = βpixi. In symmetric equilibrium this condition becomes
V = β Y
N. Taking logs and time derivatives, substituting into the arbitrage


















This is the instantaneous rate of return on equity generated by ﬁrms.
5.2 The economy’s dynamics
Assets market equilibrium requires A = NV = βY . The government budget








The saving schedule (4) and the deﬁnition c ≡ C/Y yield
˙ c
c




Substituting this expression into the one just derived and using equation











+ λ − ρ,







characterized in Proposition 1.
The output market clearing condition requires




Since entry is non-negative, one has ˙ N>0f o rY> Cand ˙ N =0o t h e r -
wise. This condition identiﬁes two regions: the entry region, where entry is
proﬁtable, and the hysteresis region, where entry is not proﬁtable and the
mass of ﬁrms is ﬁxed. For simplicity, I ignore the hysteresis region since
population growth implies that the steady state of the dynamical system is
inside the entry region. Dividing through by Y , and using the deﬁnition








T h ea n a l y s i si sn o ws t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .T h e˙ n =0l o c u si ss i m p l yc =1− βλ.
The ˙ c =0l o c u si s




This equation deﬁnes an upward sloping locus c(n)˙ c=0.C o n s i d e r n o w t h e
phase diagram in Figure 2. Paths above the saddle path eventually yield
zero or negative n and thus cannot be equilibria. Paths below the saddle
path eventually yield zero or negative c and similarly cannot be equilibria.
Hence, I have:
Proposition 2 There is a unique perfect-foresight general equilibrium: given
initial condition n0, the economy jumps on the saddle path and converges to
the steady state (n∗,c ∗).
175.3 The steady state
The characterization of the steady state is extremely simple. Substituting











This expression says that in the long run the wage and proﬁts h a r e sd e -
pend solely on the entry cost, β, and the discount rate, ρ. The intuition is








which says that ﬁrms must deliver to savers the reservation interest rate ρ,
and that to do so they must generate a proﬁtr a t i oe q u a lt oβρ. Accordingly,









Notice how taxes on labor and the replacement ratio do not enter this solu-
tion. Also, notice that l∗ is increasing in φ, η, β, ρ, γ.
Substitution of l∗ into the bargaining locus (8) yields
u∗ =
1 − τ
















Notice how, diﬀerently from the instantaneous equilibrium discussed above,
in steady state the eﬀects of structural parameters on unemployment are no
longer ambiguous. The reason is that taking into account the endogeneity
of consumption and of the mass of ﬁrms allows me to resolve the tension
between eﬀects on participation and on bargaining. Higher taxes on labor,
for example, lead workers to demand higher wages, which results in higher
unemployment. This is the upward shift of the bargaining locus discussed
above. The reason why the potentially oﬀsetting downward shift of the
participation locus is now not operational is that ﬁrm employment is pinned
down by equation (16) independently of taxation. In other words, in the long
18run the mass of ﬁrms per capita adjusts endogenously and the participation
locus in (l,u) becomes vertical and independent of taxation.








































Using these expressions, I can establish:
Proposition 3 The steady-state general equilibrium of the model is char-
acterized by the following properties:
1. the unemployment rate u is increasing in γ, τ, σ, β, ρ;
2. the employment ratio L/Λ is decreasing in ψ, γ, τ, σ, β, ρ,a n di n -
creasing in λ;
3. the participation ratio Ls/Λ is decreasing in ψ, β, ρ, and increasing













and increasing in τ otherwise.
4. The mass of ﬁrms per capita n is decreasing in γ, τ, σ, β, ρ, φ, η.
Proof. These results follow from the following properties. First, the
ratio of consumption to wages in (17) is decreasing in λ and increasing in β
and ρ. So the direct eﬀects of β and ρ on participation and employment are
negative, while the direct eﬀect of λ is positive. Second, the denominator
of (19) is increasing in u∗ so that the employment ratio is decreasing in u∗.
19Since u∗ is increasing in β and ρ, overall the employment ratio is decreasing
in β and ρ. Similarly, since u∗ is increasing in τ and the direct eﬀect of
taxation is negative, overall the employment ratio is decreasing in τ.T h i r d ,
the denominator of (18) shows that the relation between the participation
ratio and unemployment depends on the factor
1 − u∗
1 − τ − (1 − τ − σ)u∗ =
1


















is the unemployment rate that obtains absent government distortions (i.e.,
for τ = σ = 0). This factor is decreasing in u∗ and σ. Thus, the participation















Moreover, diﬀerentiating with respect to σ the denominator of (19), and











1 − τ − (1 − τ − σ)u∗
1 − u∗
¸2 1
1 − τ − σ
> 0








yields that n∗ is decreasing in τ, σ because they do not aﬀect l∗ while they
lower the employment ratio. Similarly, n∗ is decreasing in φ, η because they
do not aﬀect the employment ratio while they raise l∗. β, ρ, γ lower n∗
because they lower the employment ratio and raise ﬁrm employment.
To investigate the reason why participation might be increasing in tax-









20This expression reveals that there are three eﬀects of taxation. First there
is the direct negative eﬀect of reducing the expected after-tax beneﬁto f
participation. Then there is the indirect negative eﬀect of raising unem-
ployment thereby worsening the marginal worker’s job prospects — this is
the “discouraged worker” eﬀect discussed in Section 2. Finally there is the
























Hence, the reduction in the employment ratio due to taxation yields a re-
duction of the consumption-wage ratio. This is nothing else than a negative
income eﬀect that produces an “additional worker” eﬀect similar to that
discussed in the labor supply literature. Diﬀerentiating with respect to τ



















which says that higher taxation of labor results in higher participation when
the elasticity of employment with respect to taxation is high. Using (19) to
calculate the elasticity, I recover exactly the condition stated in the Propo-






≷ 0 ⇐⇒ 1 −
σ




which shows explicitly that the participation ratio is a U-shaped function of
taxation. The minimum of the function shifts to the left with σ and ˜ u.T h e
interpretation therefore, is that the positive relation between taxation and
participation — the dominance of the additional worker eﬀect driven by the
income eﬀect — occurs in economies with heavily distorted markets (high σ,
γ, β) and high taxation.
5.4 Output
As mentioned in the introduction, the analysis of this paper is predicated on
the notion that unemployment matters because it inserts a wedge between
labor supply and employment. Employment in turn determines output,
which is one of the prominent measures of economic performance we focus
on. It tis thus important to make explicit how the labor and product market
outcomes result in particular level of GDP.
21In symmetric equilibrium, the production functions (1) and (3) yield
Y = N (l − φ)
θ or y ≡
Y
Λ
= n(l − φ)
θ .
This reveals that there are competing eﬀects of many parameters on output
per capita due to the fact that n and l move in opposite directions (recall
Proposition 1). For example, l∗ is increasing in φ, η, β, ρ, γ,w h i l en∗ is
decreasing in φ, η, β, ρ, γ. Interestingly, τ and σ have an unambiguous
negative eﬀect because they do not aﬀect l∗ while they depress n∗ through
their negative eﬀect on the employment ratio (L/Λ)
∗.
A related, and perhaps more interesting measure of performance, is the

































This too exhibits competing eﬀects that prevent unambiguous analytical
statements concerning the role of many structural parameters. Once again,
however, taxation appears to be special. As argued, in highly regulated
economies taxation of wages results in higher participation because of a
dominant income eﬀect. It follows that τ unambiguously reduces welfare
because it reduces output per capita y∗, and therefore consumption per
capita of both market goods and household goods. The reason is that a
large fraction of the representative household members end up spending
their time in the unemployment state, which neither earns them a wage nor
allows them to engage in household activity.
6T h e E ﬀe c t so fL a b o ra n dP r o d u c tM a r k e tF a c -
tors
One of the interesting properties of this model is that it allows me to study
the transitional dynamics in response to structural changes. In this section,
I exploit this property to discuss the eﬀects of factors aﬀecting the labor
and product markets. Some of these factors are good analytical proxies for
frictions, regulations and other policy interventions that aﬀect the bargain-
ing power of workers (γ), the cost of labor (τ, σ), work practices and/or the
operating costs of ﬁrms (φ), the costs of setting up new businesses (β)a n d
22the degree of substitution among products and thus of price competition
among producers (²).
I begin the analysis with a discussion of an important aspect of the inter-
action between labor and products markets. Namely that the endogenous
participation rate produces a reinforcing mechanism that ampliﬁes the ef-
fects on employment of structural changes that aﬀect the labor market. To
see this, consider equations (18) and (19) and set ψ =0 . T h i sr e m o v e s





so that structural parameters aﬀect employment only through the unem-
ployment rate. If ψ > 0, instead, there are additional eﬀects due to the








In some cases, the eﬀects due to participation work in the opposite direction
of the direct wedge eﬀect of unemployment and one needs to work out the
balance. This is what equation (19) does, revealing for example that the
negative eﬀect of labor taxes τ and unemployment beneﬁts σ on employment
is larger because of the participation channel.
In the following analysis, I show how this feature of the model reinforces
two important feedback mechanisms linking the labor and product markets.
The ﬁrst is due to the endogenous mass of ﬁrms and produces a multiplier
eﬀect that ampliﬁes the role of structural changes that originate in the la-
bor market. A second multiplier eﬀect operates in the opposite direction.
Namely, the endogenous market size due to the participation and unemploy-
ment margins ampliﬁes the eﬀects on entry decisions, and therefore on the
mass of ﬁrms, of structural changes that originate in the product market.
6.1 Factors Aﬀecting the Labor Market: The First Multi-
plier Eﬀect
Consider Figure 2. If τ increases, the ˙ n = 0 locus is unchanged while the
˙ c = 0 locus shifts to the left. The economy then jumps on the saddle path
that converges to new steady state which features the same consumption
ratio as the initial one and a lower mass of ﬁrms per capita. On impact,
23the mass of ﬁrms is given while the consumption ratio jumps up. According
to Proposition 1, the rise in c and τ produces a fall in ﬁrm employment l
and the employment ratio L/Λ, and possibly an increase in unemployment
u. I say possibly because, as discussed in section 3, the direct eﬀect of τ
on unemployment is ambiguous due the endogeneity of the participation
rate. According to (12) the fall in ﬁrm employment l produces a rise in the
labor share WL/Y.A c c o r d i n gt o( 1 0 ) ,ﬁnally, the competing eﬀects of the
higher consumption ratio, wage share, and unemployment rate produce an
ambiguous change in participation. One might conjecture that the direct
negative eﬀect of taxation of wages tilt the balance toward a fall of the
participation ratio. Unfortunately, I have been unable to prove analytically
that this is the case.
The transition features falling c and n. According to Proposition 1, then,
it features rising ﬁrm employment l and unemployment u. The rising l in
turn produces a falling labor share. The competing eﬀects of the falling c
and n produce an ambiguous change in the employment ratio. However, we
know that at the end of the transition the employment rate must be lower
so that eventually the rate must be falling. As to the participation rate, the
competing eﬀects of its determinants again result in an ambiguous change.
Since the steady state eﬀects are known, however, one can infer that if the tax
increase occurs in a highly regulated economy it results in the participation
rate eventually rising because of the dominant income eﬀect (see Proposition
3). The reverse happens in a lightly regulated economy.
To see the role of the endogenous mass of ﬁrms, one simply compares
what happens on impact, when the mass of ﬁrms is given, to the end-of-
transition situation. There is a clear multiplier eﬀect at work in that the
gradual reduction of the mass of ﬁrms per capita drives unemployment up
and employment down further than the initial tax increase warrants. The
reason is that with higher taxation workers demand higher wages and the
associated higher labor cost requires the market to become more concen-
trated in order to sustain ﬁrms’ proﬁtability and allow them to deliver to
households the reservation interest rate ρ. Crucially, since ﬁrm employment
l in the long run does not respond to taxation, the smaller mass of ﬁrms per
capita must be produced by a combination of lower employment and higher
unemployment. The latter margin is very important, because in highly reg-
ulated economies the participation rate goes up so that to produce a lower
employment rate requires a large increase in the unemployment rate.
The replacement ratio has eﬀects similar to those of the tax on wages
with the important diﬀerence that the tax reduces participation (labor sup-
ply) while the replacement ratio raises it. Hence, the tax creates less unem-
24ployment than the replacement ratio.
A factor that has attracted much attention recently is the parameter γ
that measures the bargaining power of workers. Consider again Figure 2.
If γ increases, the ˙ n = 0 locus is unchanged while the ˙ c =0l o c u ss h i f t st o
the left. The economy jumps on the saddle path that converges to the new
steady state, experiencing a falling consumption ratio and a falling mass of
ﬁrms per capita along the transition. So far all this is quite similar to the
eﬀects of a rise in the tax on wages. The details, however, diﬀer in some
crucial aspect.
When γ rises, on impact the mass of ﬁrms is given while the consump-
tion ratio jumps up. According to Proposition 1, the rise in c produces a
fall in ﬁrm employment l and the employment ratio L/Λ, and an increase
in unemployment u. However, the direct eﬀect of γ on ﬁrm employment
and the employment rate is now ambiguous. The diﬀerent behavior of these
variables with respect to the case of taxation is that higher bargaining power
of workers attracts participation instead of discouraging it because it raises
wages. If ﬁrm employment falls, it produces a rise in the labor share WL/Y.
This eﬀect is in fact stronger than in the case of taxation because γ redis-
tributes rents from ﬁrms to workers (they capture a larger share of proﬁts)
and thus raises the wage share directly. Again the competing eﬀects of the
higher consumption ratio, wage share, and unemployment rate produce an
ambiguous change in participation.
The transition features falling c and n. This produces a rising ﬁrm
employment l and unemployment rate u. The rising l in turn produces a
falling labor share. The competing eﬀects of the falling c and n produce
an ambiguous change in the employment ratio. However, we know that
at the end of the transition the employment ratio must be lower so that
eventually the ratio must be falling. As to the participation rate, again,
the competing eﬀects result in an ambiguous change. Since the steady state
eﬀect is positive, however, one can infer that the higher bargaining power
results in the participation rate eventually rising. This fact is important.
Contrary to the instantaneous equilibrium where the ambiguous eﬀect of γ
comes from the endogenous variables, c and u, in steady state the dominant
factor driving participation up is the additional worker eﬀect due to higher
unemployment. To see this, observe that in equation (18) the consumption
ratio and the labor share in the long run do not depend on γ,o n l yu∗ does.
One can again see the multiplier eﬀect of the mass of ﬁrms per capita
by comparing impact to steady state eﬀects. Interestingly, γ has a per-
manent positive eﬀect on ﬁrm employment and thus drives unemployment
up further than taxation of wages. The reason is again that the higher la-
25bor cost requires the market to become more concentrated to sustain ﬁrms’
proﬁtability and allow them to deliver to households the reservation interest
rate ρ. However, since ﬁrm employment now must rise, and the employment
ratio falls, the fall in the mass of ﬁrms must be larger.
6.2 Factors Aﬀecting the Product Market: The Second Mul-
tiplier Eﬀect
To consider the eﬀects of changes in the toughness of price competition, ²,





and refer again to Figure 2. When ² increases,
the economy jumps on the saddle path that converges to a point located to
the left of the initial one on the same ˙ n = 0 locus. The associated transi-
tion features changes in c and n in line with the discussion of the previous
subsection. The main diﬀerence concerns the long run eﬀects. Perhaps
surprisingly, in the long run ² does not aﬀect unemployment and the em-
ployment and participation ratios. The reason why is in fact quite intuitive.
In steady state ﬁrms must deliver to shareholders the reservation interest
rate ρ, and this pins down the proﬁt share according to the relation in (15).
Consequently, changes in ² are absorbed by ﬁrm employment l in such a way
that keeps the proﬁt ratio constant. But this implies that the employment
elasticity of revenue does not respond to ². Consequently, both the unem-
ployment rate and the labor share do not respond to ². This in turn means
the participation and employment ratios as well do not respond to ².
Consider now the role of barriers to entry. Together with the population
growth rate λ, this is the only factor that aﬀects the consumption ratio in
steady state. The reason is that it pins down the amount of “replacement
investment” needed to keep constant the mass of ﬁrms per capita. Moreover,
as discussed above, β determines the proﬁt and labor shares. Consider
Figure 2. If β rises, the ˙ n =0l o c u ss h i f t sd o w nw h i l et h e˙ c =0l o c u ss h i f t s
to the left. The economy then jumps on the saddle path that leads to the
new steady state, featuring lower n∗ and c∗. The reason is that the higher β
implies that steady-state incumbency is more costly and thus that the rate of
return is equal to ρ only if the mass of ﬁrms falls. The smaller mass of ﬁrms
reduces employment and raises unemployment. This captures the second
multiplier eﬀect. Higher barriers to entry ultimately raise the proﬁts h a r e
and thus redistribute rents toward proﬁts. This lowers the labor share and
discourages participation. At the same time, it raises ﬁrm employment l and
thus raises the wage markup, thereby raising unemployment. Accordingly,
employment falls. Most importantly, the reduction of the mass of ﬁrms per
capita is larger than it would be if employment were held constant.T h e r ei s
26thus a reinforcing feedback mechanism whereby the redistribution of rents
away from wages shrinks the size of the market and thus requires a further
reduction of the mass of ﬁrms per capita.
7 Conclusion
The view that unemployment is high in economies where the state provides
long-lasting unemployment beneﬁts that are unrelated to the individual’s
eﬀort to ﬁnd work, the labor force is organized in sectoral or ﬁrm-level
unions that do not coordinate their activities, and taxation raises the cost of
labor, is generally correct and supported by much of the available empirical
evidence. It is, however, incomplete because it ignores the characteristics
of the product market. There are good reasons, theoretical and empirical,
to think that in addition to labor market frictions, unemployment depends
on a broad class of factors that characterize the structure of the product
market.
In this paper, I discussed a model where ﬁrms bargain with unions over
wages and employment levels. This interaction generates unemployment.
Households take the associated unemployment risk as given in making their
participation decisions. I have thus been able to study the interactions
of product and labor market institutions in a three-states representation
of the labor market. This features allowed me to uncover two feedback
mechanisms, each reinforced by endogenous participation. Speciﬁcally:
• The adverse eﬀects on output of regulations and frictions that raise la-
bor costs, work practice rigidities and the bargaining power of workers
are larger when one considers endogenous participation. This reinforc-
ing mechanism captures the fact that the induced fall in employment
is larger when labor supply is elastic and individuals withdraw from
the labor force in response to a worsening of the labor market.
• T h ef a l li ne m p l o y m e n ts h r i n k st h es i z eo ft h em a r k e ta n dt h e r e b y
triggers a reduction in the number of ﬁrms. This feedback mechanism
entails a multiplier eﬀect that ampliﬁes the adverse eﬀects on output
of labor market factors because the fall in the number of ﬁrms reduces
employment further than what would be warranted if one considered
the labor market in isolation.
• The endogeneity of employment entails a feedback mechanism running
from the product market to the labor market. Speciﬁcally, regulations
27and frictions that raise the costs of entry and/or of operation for ﬁrms
result in a larger reduction of the number of ﬁrms than would obtain
if employment were held constant. There is thus another multiplier
eﬀect at work that exploits the endogeneity of market size to amplify
the adverse eﬀects on output of interventions that worsen the product
market.
• Because the multiplier eﬀect running from the product to the labor
market is driven by the endogeneity of employment, the adverse eﬀects
on output of product market regulations are actually stronger when one
considers endogenous participation.
The analysis of these feedback mechanisms has interesting implications
for the current policy debate. Labor market reforms that reduce the cost
of labor, like those advocated by the OECD in its Jobs Study (1994), are
actually more attractive when one considers the endogenous structure of the
product market because of the ampliﬁed beneﬁts in terms of employment
and unemployment. Similarly, the increase in entry that product market
reforms generate is larger than one would expect if the labor market eﬀect
were ignored. This provides a theoretical rationale for the pro-competitive
reforms advocated in a series of studies undertaken at the McKinsey Global
Institute (1995, 1997) and shows that these reforms are in fact more attrac-
tive when one considers the positive feedback on market structure that runs
through the labor market.
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